I
Rousseau himself has told the story of his beginnings as a literary man. During the summer of 1749 he was in the habit of paying a daily visit to his friend Diderot, who was imprisoned at the chateau of Vincennes, five miles from Paris. As he could not afford to hire a carriage, he walked the distance and back every day. H e would start in the early afternoon and read a book as he tramped the road. On one such walk he was looking through a copy of the Mercure de France when his eye was caught by the announcement that the Academy of Dijon was offering a prize for the best essay on the theme : "Whether the Progress of the Sciences and Arts H as Contributed to Corrupt or to Purify Manners."
Rousseau was electrified. "The moment I read this," he writes in the Confessions, "I saw another universe, and I became another man." He sat down by the wayside and scribbled out a brief essay which lamented the fact that Rome, in her days of luxury and splendour, had ' Iorgotten her ancient virtue and austerity. When he arrived at Vincennes, in a state of feverish excitement, he read the short paper to Diderot who encouraged him to develop the idea and to submit the essay for the prize. Rousseau did so; he won the prize and became famous.
Traditional opinion, following Rousseau's own lead, has seen in this maiden effort but a faint adumbration of what was to come from his pen. It seems to me, on the contrary, that even this early work already shows the mature Rousseau, the master dialectician and cunning Machiavellian, that uncanny mixture of noble idealism and practical, even grossly utilitarian, spirit which we find in all his later writings.
Consider the task which Rousseau set for himself. He is to convince a body of academicians-scholars, scientists, artists-that the sciences and arts which they cultivate are born and bred in corruption. He knows that he is a nobody; yet this nobody expects the learned men to listen quietly as he pronounces them to be cOITupters of morals and promoters of decadence. What is more, he expects them to award him a prize for this performance. And he does his job so well, that he does get the prize! Rousseau's technique in handling this situation is masterly. It reveals a mixture of humility and arrogance, the two basic qualities of his personal psychology. Thus, in the very first paragraph he presents his credentials, so to speak, by describing himself as an upright man who knows nothing, hut who thinks no less of himself for that. Having both humbled and exalted himself, he now proceeds to do the same for the jury of academicians. While admitting the paradoxical nature of his mission, he slyly relies on the honesty of his judges to do him justice. A just sovereign, he argues, has never hesitated to condemn himself when the evidence was against him. And a man need never be afraid to face an upright and enlightened opponent, even when he is the judge in his own case. Then, having disarmed his judges, he fires a shot designed to pierce the heart of a possible enemy: even if his defence of the truth does not receive the Academy's award, there is one prize it cannot fail to receive-HI shall find that in the bottom of my heart." This is the first public appeal to that famous heart.
Toward the end of the essay he again uses the same disarming tactics. Having delivered a withering attack on the over-emphasis of intellect at the expense of morals, he feels that it is time to soothe the ruffled feelings of the judges. He therefore tells them that the glory which will be his if he wins the prize cannot compare with that which will descend upon the academicians for having offered it. He further softens the blow by pointing out that the evil which science has brought upon the world has been checked by scientists themselves, through their academies, which watch over the maintenance of high standards of integrity among their members. This, of course, blunts the sharp edge of the main argument, but it succeeds in sweetening the bitter taste that the core of the essay may have left in the learned mouths.
II
From the dense thicket of facts or pseudo-facts that crowd the little tract, one may perhaps single out the following as basic to the main argument. Culture (to use a convenient term which includes both the sciences and the arts) is immoral in its origin as well as in it aim. In origin: astronomy is born out of superstition; eloquence has its source in ambition, hatred, flattery, and lying; geometry in avarice; jurisprudence in human injustice; history in tyranny, war, and con~ spiracy; even ethics arises from human pride. In aim: culture seeks to rationalize and make acceptable the slavery into which societythat is, organized communal life-has thrown us. Culture is thus a huge propaganda machine for the state. It weans man away from his original state of freedom and simple honesty, and gives him in return nothing but a veneer of politeness, courtesy, and affectation. But beneath the court uniform lurk suspicion, umbrage, fear, hatred, and treachery. It is true that civilized society frowns on crude religious profanation, but it en joys witty blasphemy. It does not allow us to praise ourselves, but has no objection to our slandering our neighbour. We have developed a strong feeling of patriotism, but we hate other nations more intensely than we ever did before.
Thus all culture is shown to be a veneer of beauty that covers decay and corruption. And this misfortune is not peculiar to our age alone; it has always been so. The souls of men have become corrupt in proportion to the advance of civilization. The two phenomena are tied together as the ebb and flow of the tides. The proof for this sweeping assertion is offered by the contrast between the decadent civilizations of Egypt, Greece, Rome, Constantinople, and China, and the healthy moral tone of life in Sparta, Persia, Scythia, among the Teutonic tribes and in early Rome.
The component parts of our civilized life are in tum subjected to a brief but severe drubbing.
He bids us consider religion. Early man, innocent and virtuous, was not afraid to shelter his gods in his hut and let them be witnesses of his daily conduct. When he became sophisticated and wicked, he banished these inconvenient spectators into magnificent temples. Later he even vied with the gods in building sumptuous palaces for himself. This hubris sharpened his appetite for vice; never was depravity carried to such extremes as under the roofs of the palatial residences of the rich. And what of philosophy? What are philosophers, he asks, but a pack of charlatans, each of whom offers a nostrum of his own for the ills of mankind, each panacea flatly contradicting its rivals? As for statecraft, the principal goal of modern life is to get rich. So, while ancient statesmen talked only of virtue and morals, the modern politician is concerned only with money and trade. Today men are valued like cattle, for what they can fetch on the market. A man's worth to the state is in direct ratio to what he consumes. Hence the idle Sybarite is worth thirty frugal Lacedaemonians.
Rousseau's indictment of education already foreshadows the programme set forth in Emile, although here he contents himself with a negative criticism. His point of view is that of our contemporary teachers' colleges: it is a waste of public money to teach children anything that will not be useful to them in later life. Hence he condemns the "dead" classical languages, the writing of verse, and the study of empty rhetoric.
Most scathing of all is the attack on men of letters. Rousseau regards the artist as a destructive critic, out of sympathy with the true needs of humanity, intoxicated with his command over words, animated by a contemptible desire to shine, abusing his gift of language to create unsettling paradoxes, which sap the foundations of belief and destroy virtue. This irrepressible desire on the part of the artist to show off his cleverness drives the masses into the arms of atheism. Moreover, the need for applause at all costs moves the artist to pander to public taste. He lowers his artistic and ethical standards and writes for the day rather than for eternity. And Rousseau specifically cites Voltaire as an example. The truly great man, on the other hand, who is firm and noble enough to defy the low tastes of his contemporaries, is doomed to poverty and oblivion. Our modern cult of art for art's sake has been most deleterious to the practice of virtue. We no longer ask whether a writer is virtuous or not; we want to know whether he has talent. Of a book we ask, not, Is it useful? but, Is it well written?
The principal instrument for the dissemination of the corrupting influence of literature is the printing press. The impious writings of the ancients perished with their authors; the press has given im-mortality to our own impieties. In a footnote Rousseau suggests that the burning of the famous library at Alexandria, a standard subject of lamentation, was in reality a fortunate event. The press has made possible the popularization of knowledge, which means for R ousseau the corruption of morals on a large scale. The press has admitted into the temple of the sciences and arts a mob of mediocrities who might have become excellent artisans, but are doomed to spend their lives as inferior geometers or bad versifiers. Genius, he says, needs no schools. A Cicero, a Bacon, a Descartes, or a Newton will of their own strength raise monuments to the glory of the human mind. As for the rest of us, it were far better to remain in the bliss of ignorance and obscurity, doing good to our fellow men and leaving t o the few great the task of educating humanity.
Rousseau ends with a peroration: "0 Virtue, sublime science of simple souls, must one possess an elaborate machinery to know you? Are not your principles engraved in all our hearts? And is it n ot enough, if one would learn your laws, to turn inward and listen to the voice of one's conscience amidst the silence of one's passion? That is true philosophy; let us learn to be satisfied with it. And rather than envy the glory of those famous men who achieve immortality in the republic of letters, let us establish between us and them that glorious distinction which characterized two great peoples of antiquity: the one talked well, the other acted well."
III
The fundamental attitude underlying the pamphlet is that Calvinist puritanism in which Rousseau was brought up and which periodically took possession of his naturally libertine soul. It has been pointed out how often the word "virtue" recurs in the essay, and virtue for Rousseau generally means renunciation of the luxuries of life, the ideal we associate with early Roman life, and even more with primitive Christianity and its modern manifestation in Calvinism. Hostility to luxury breathes from every sentence of the tract. This is important, because it shows Rousseau challenging the fashion in thought prevalent among the most advanced circles of the day. For the problem of luxury had been a topic of lively discussion since the publication of Bernard de Mandeville's Fable of the Bees in 1714. The "progressive" intellectuals were on the side of luxury. In attacking it, Rousseau was therefore aiming at the vital spot in the enemy's armour. And when he included the arts and sciences in his onslaught, on the ground that they were born of luxury, the rout of the enemy would be complete.
As in the case of Plato and Tolstoy, then, we have the paradoxical situation of a great artist using his art to condemn art-a phenomenon that was to grow in popularity in the later nineteenth century. The incongruity of the position has often been noted: here is a keen intelligence proving by the use of intelligence that intelligence is corrupt. Does this not nullify the criticism itself as the product of depravity? But such argumentation is mere verbal quibbling. Rousseau himself disposed of this objection in the various defences he wrote to those who challenged his main thesis. His indictment of culture, he points out, is a relative one. He is really saying that the exclusive, or even excessive, development of the intellectual faculties at the expense of the emotional life leads to decadence. What he advocates is the return to a new appreciation of the irrational forces in life, which the Age of Reason had suppressed as being "marks of the beast." But he was well aware, despite Voltaire's taunt, that man could not go down on all fours again. Like every salesman, he tended to over-advertise his product and make extravagant claims for it. But when we have made the usual discount for enthusiasm, there is still a solid core of truth left. And the over-statement served the purpose of calling our attention to the subject in the first place.
To find a concrete embodiment of the healthy life, Rousseau had recourse to the myth of the natural man or noble savage. Scholars have disputed among themselves whether Rousseau was ever a believer in the noble savage and the idyllic state of nature. There are many obscurities and contradictions in his basic definitions, and these have proved fertile soil for multiplying distinctions. A careful analysis of texts does show that Rousseau was never more than a very lukewarm admirer of primitive peoples. But to the casual reader (and until recently all reading of this First Discourse was casual), the contrast between primitive innocence and civilized corruption must have stood out clearly enough from the text of the essay. That is the lesson which the age was ready, even eager, to learn.
For the question arises: how did it happen that the Academy of Dijon proposed such a subject at all? Is it natural for a body of learned men to undermine its own position by propounding a question in such a way that it virtually invites a humiliating answer? The fact of the matter is, of course, that the noble savage was anything but a novel notion to Rousseau's contemporaries. From the Renais~ sanee aD, the idea of "primitivism" or K ulturpessimismus had be. come acclimatized in European thought. Erasmus writes in his Praise of Folly (1512): School knowledge ... derives its origin from the author of all abominations. . . . The simple people of the golden age were furnished with no such school knowledge. Nature alone sufficed to guide them; instinct, to prompt them how to live. . . . What would have been the use of the principles of logic to men amongst whom conflicting arguments never arose? ... What would have been the advantage of jurisprudence to men amongst whom bad morals-the sole apology for good laws-had no existence? As then the professional arts prosper in proportion as they are characterized by folly, so by far the happiest people in the world are those 'Who are in a position to dispense with artificial training altogether, and to follow solely nature as their guide . . . . It is clear to you, I presume, now that those who make wisdom their study, by so doing, make themselves the most miserable of mankind. . . . On the other hand the least miserable of mankind-those who are as little miserable as it is possible for men to be-are those who in condition and intelligence arc very little superior to mere brutes, who are content with their lowly lot, and have no ambition for anything beyond it.
1
Montaigne writes in similar vein in two of his essays. Of the "cannibals" he says:
They are even savage, as we call those fruits wild, which nature of herself and of her ordinary progress has produced; whereas indeed they are those which ourselves have altered by our artificial devices, and diverted from their common order we 'Should tenn savage. In those arc the true and most profitable virtues and natural properties most lively and vigorous, which in these we have bastardized, applying them to the pleasure of our corrupted taste. And if notwithstanding, in divers fruits of those countries that were never tilled, we shan find that in respect of ours they are most excellent, and as delicate unto our taste, there is no reason art should gain the point of honour of our great and puissant mother nature. We have so much by our inventions surcharged the beauties and riches of her works, that we have altogether overchoked her; yet wherever her purity shineth, she makes our vain and frivolous enterprises wonderfully ashamed.'
In the essay "On Coaches" he is even more outspoken.
Our world hath of late discovered another . . . no less large, fully peopled, all things yielding, and mighty in strength than ours, nevertheless so new and infantine, that he is yet to learn his ABC. It is not yet full fifty years that he knew neither letters, nor weight, nor measures, nor apparel, nor corn, nor vines. But was a11 naked, simply pure, in Nature's lap, and lived but with such means and food as his mother nurse afforded him. . . . I fear that by our contagion we shall directly have furthered his declination, and hastened his ruin; and th at we shall too dearly have sold him our opinions, our new fangles and our arts. It was an unpolluted, harmless, infant world; yet have we not whipped and submitted the same unto our discipline, or schooled him by the advantage of our valour and natural forces, nor have we in~ structed him by our justice and integrity; nor subdued by our magnanimity. Most of their answers, and a number of the negotiations we have had with them, witness that they were nothing short of us, nor beholding to us for any excellency of natural wit or perspicuity, concerning pertinency . . . . But concerning unfeined devotion, awful observance of laws, unspotted integrity, bounteous liberality, due loyalty and free liberty, it hath greatly availed us that we had not so much as they ; by which advantage they have lost, cast away, sold, undone and betrayed themselves. S Samuel Richardson the novelist, from whom Rousseau learned much, had repeatedly propounded the thesis that stupidity and virtue, intelligence and vice are allied, In fact, was there ever a time when man, in his dissatisfaction with the present, did not look back wistfully into a hazy past when things were better and men more innocent? The Hebrew myth of the fall of man, as told in Genesis, contains all the ingredients of Rousseau's paradox, Adam and Eve live in a state of primitive innocence until they arc tempted by the serpent to eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge, which will reveal to them the difference between good and eviL The serpent is cunning-a wily, corrupt intellectual, a tainted professor; and he destroys his innocent victims by enlightening them, The writer in Genesis feels much as Rousseau did about the whole matter; he is a Kulturpessimist, Again, consider the Greek myth of Narcissus. The blind seer Tiresias is asked by the nymph Liriope whether her son Narcissus will attain a ripe age, He replies: he will live long only if he remains unconscious of his selfhood, But, as we know, Narcissus sees his own face in the surface of the water and loses his pristine happiness; he has been corrupted by the birth of self-consciousness, The myth of Prometheus restates the same theme in another form, For what was Prometheus' crime against the gods? that he sought to bring the rudiments of culture to his fellow men, Indeed, the literature of the Greeks and Romans abounds in dreams of a golden age in the remote past, when innocence and simplicity were everywhere, And invariably the cause of decay is given as the growth of civilization or intellectRousseau's thesis, then, was anything but noveL In the world of ideas, however, there is no patent office. Not the man who originates an idea is acclaimed, but the man who manages to give the idea currency. For one rcason or another Rousseau's attack on culture electrified the intellectual world of his day as no one before him had succeeded in doing, Not all the intellectuals were convinced, of course. Voltaire attacked Rousseau's paradox as a slander on mankind. But the thinking public in general was impressed. No matter how many modifications R ousseau subsequently made in his original thesis, his name and prestige henceforth clung to the doctrine of K ulturpessimismus. Though the Second Discourse (Discours sur l'origine de I'inegalite parmi les hom m es) shows clearly that R ousseau is not enamoured of the pure state of nature, and does not grow sentimental over the noble savage, yet the doctrine remained his. In The Social Contract he repudiates the m yth of primitivism outright and sees the golden age in the future, based on a proper organization of society according to the social contract. N o malter; the m yth stuck to him.
And what a history it has had! One is tempted to say that, wherever the word "Romantic)' appears, there lurks the spectre of K ulturpessimismus. From Goethe's Werther to the novels of D. H . Lawrence, the cult of primitive irrational innocence is carried on. A weird host of recruits has enrolled under the banner of J ean-Jacques' paradox. There one sees the noble proletarian of the M arxists and the noble Aryan of the Nazis marching side hy side, despite their radical difference in outlook on life. Freud's central thesis in Civilization and Us Discontents is hut a restatement of the primitivist credo; so is the underlying thesis of Spengler's Decline of the W est . The one theme that has pursued Thomas Mann through all his novels, stories, and philosophical essays is this very problem of the relation between intellect and instinct, or (as he calls them) nature and spirit.
It is Rousseau's merit to have revealed with special clarity the problematical nature of intellect, and to have suggested that the religion of progress and perfectibility, so dear to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is a heresy. But it is clear that both R ousseau himself and those who have worked with his paradox have been reactionaries. Voltaire was right, from his "enlightened" point of view, in damning Rousseau as a renegade. For Rousseau's. position in the First Discourse is that of an old T ory, who is "agin" all the newfangled notions of the hair-brained intellectuals. H e calls for a return to the simple crude honesty of the common m an, is opposed to the education of the masses, disapproves of the vulgarization of knowledge.
In labelling Rousseau a "reactionary" I do not wish to "smear" him. I repeat: his warning that the unfettered development of intellect is pernicious was a meritorious act at the time it was uttered. Rousseau's immediate influence was therefore salutary. But it cannot be denied that his many followers in the last two centuries have all too frequently fonned the phalanx of anti-humanism, whether of the right or of the left.
It is against this anti-humanism that Goethe's figure rises as a symbolic challenge. It was Nietzsche who singled out Rousseau and Goethe as the prototypes of two educational models for modern man.
The contrast between the positions represented by Rousseau's First Discourse and by Goethe's mature humanism is indeed extreme.
Goethe stood for the complete self-realization of man through a harmonious development of all the faculties. While not a rationalist in the narrow eighteenth-century sense of the tenn, Goethe believed that the good life could be achieved only by a proper ordering of the impulses, with the reason somewhere near the top and the aggressive instincts at the bottom. Underlying his conception of man's destiny was an optimism (though not a sentimental one) which believed that a gradual improvement in man's estate could take place. Goethe felt that, while man could never attain such a pinnacle of perfection that he might dispense with what the theologians call divine grace, yet he could achieve a large measure of salvation by his own efforts.
In contrast to this "enlightened" programme, the Rousseau of 1750 champions the bliss of ignorance, thumps the tub of the oldfashioned, repressive Calvinist virtues, with a liberal mixture of crude utilitarianism.
1749 or 1750? Between these two dates there is an abyss which cannot be bridged. We must choose.
